English Evolutionary Ethics

Spencer and Stephen. It is somewhat crude in its statement but it conveys the real essence of the good from the strictly evolutionistic point of view. It is referred to incidentally in that chapter of the Descent of Man in which the development of the moral sense is discussed. In the case of the lower animals, he says, it seems much more appropriate to speak of their social instincts as having been developed for the general good, rather than for the general happiness of the species. Then follows his famous definition of the general good, as the rearing of the greatest number of individuals in full vigor and health with all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are subjected. And as the social Instincts both of man and the lower animals have been developed by nearly the same steps, it would be advisable to take as the standard of morality the general good or welfare, rather than the general happiness. Darwin thus does not think of agreeable feeling in self and others as being the goal of moral effort. Biologically and sociologically there is something more important than that. It agrees practically with the purely evolutionistic statements of the ideal according to Spencer and Stephen, the greatest totality of life in length and breadth in self and others, and the health of the social organism. The only criticism to be made of this frank and clear statement by Darwin of the ideal from the evolutionistic point of view, must be ma... --This text refers to an alternate Paperback edition.